On the Notion of Absolute Truth

It may occur to someone that the existence of an absolute truth is a philosophical question on which agreement has not been reached for centuries. Therefore, that same person may opine that it is inappropriate to invoke the notion of absolute truth.

Also, it may appear that there is no analogy between the “one is not equal to two” statement of an absolute truth, perceiving it as an axiom, or the definition of velocity, on the one hand, and on the other, the absolute fact that all humanity shares the same biology, whereby it is felt that the word absolute must be in quotations.

The above, both as doubt regarding the reality of absolute truth and as uncertainty of whether the analogy with absolute truths is legitimate, is some misimpression by some readers, which they have acquired under the pressure of the post-modern propaganda that is flooding the territories inhabited by the younger generation, especially in their institutions of study. In connection with all that, it needs to be noted that philosophy is an outlived stage in the cognitive development of humanity. The first, to, in effect, reject it, when truth is sought, was Galileo. In this regard, it is not at all true that “one is not equal to two” is an axiom, nor that the definition of velocity is something temporary, that can be changed one day. These are absolute truths that are unshakable, and no prison of the mind, which philosophy is, can, not only not abrogate them, but even have any valid relation to them. Philosophy, because of its immanent limitation to the workings of the mind, detached from the objective outside reality, does not have the tools that would allow it to speak truthfully in relation to these absolute truths. Philosophy wanders within its own subjective prison, which essentially prevents it from truthfully judging the external object. As mentioned, Galileo was the first true liberator from this prison, when he rejected the metaphysical, perceptual philosophy of Aristotle. Unfortunately, there have been relapses of such intellectual imprisonment over the centuries, with Immanuel Kant probably the most prominent representative of this relapse. Open his work “Critique of Pure Reason” and see it for yourself—it commences from the very outset with “all our knowledge begins with experience”, which determines the tenor of the entire book. Experience of the subject, or perception in terms of Aristotle’s philosophy, however, makes no connection with the true realities of the external world, the true relationships within the object, the “noumenon”, as Kant labels it, and between the object and other external objects. Nowadays, a bacchanalia of such an incoherent thesis is being pushed, namely that there is no truth, let alone absolute truth, that all truth is a matter of interpretation, a matter of point of view, that truth is only an invention and a metaphor. This is a mean-spirited subversion of the foundations of thought through the inculcation of post-modernism, that is based on nothing.

The study of the inner workings of the mind, which is the subject of philosophy in general, even if we are not concerned with its particular aberrations of the post-modern variety, is essentially a subject with which psychology is concerned and which is insufficient for a true understanding of the world.

Conversely, science recognizes absolute truths, but, because they are in short supply, science is mostly concerned with the study of relative truths, which it one day either rejects or they become absolute truths. Of course, many times, relative truths, which can always be questioned, are retained in science for the lack of any other choice and the resolution can be postponed indefinitely. This difficulty gives rise to exploring different approaches in the search of final answer to problems, which is the reason for the wrong impression that there is no truth but only interpretations and metaphors. The social sphere is especially vulnerable in this respect, and this is where consensus, the other word for non-scientificity, finds its place the most. No need to add that the social sphere is not science, especially because final solutions in that sphere are never to be reached to a great extent. This answers the question of why there cannot be an affirmative answer to the question “Isn’t the truth one?”, when it comes to social “sciences” and most of the humanities. Science, as said, recognizes that, when it is established, truth is one, while understanding that contemplating various roads to that establishment is the natural course of reaching the truth.

This was in regard to absolute truth—absolute truths there are indeed, and it is not for limited philosophy to pronounce, least of all to abrogate, anything on this subject.

Probably it will make sense to say a few more words on the very generator of confusion in today’s world, arriving from the fundamental thought “all our knowledge begins with experience”, underlying all else in his philosophical universe, of the one who is considered probably the greatest philosopher of modern times, Immanuel Kant. As said, his philosophy and the cited thought, in particular, is a modern regurgitation of a similar understanding, first enunciated in antiquity.

Now, picture Galileo dropping a stone from the Tower of Pisa, and us witnessing that from aside. Our experience (with Galileo’s, of course) is that the stone falls straight from the Tower of Pisa, and since Kant said that “all our knowledge begins with experience,” if we believe Kant, we will conclude that the earth does not rotate. Galileo did not conclude that. This brought him to the court of Inquisition, but we will leave history behind in this writing. If we now proceed to regard our just mentioned conclusion as knowledge that begins with the experience from the observation of the straight trajectory of the falling stone, we would be in error. The conclusion that the earth is not turning, following from our experience of observing the straight path of the falling stone, is wrong. Experience has not brought us knowledge, if we should call knowledge only the correct conclusion. Contrary to Kant’s assumption, experience for us in this case is not the beginning of knowledge at all, but has given rise to a falsity. We can have other experiences, and they can all lead us to further erroneous conclusions. Without further guidance, our endeavor will not begin with either experience or indeed end with knowledge, and we will always stumble into the dead end of confusion.

So, with Galileo, we began with experience. We dropped a stone from the Leaning Tower of Pisa, but that did not bring us knowledge in its true sense—Foucault came with his pendulum and showed us, for our experience pleasure, that what we thought is knowledge, regarding outcome from the experiment (experience) with the stone, is in error. Thus, we find that not “all our knowledge begins with experience”. In order to acquire the correct knowledge from Foucault’s experiment, we began with falsity and had to readjust our experience to another, better, experience. Of course, we might have begun with Foucault’s experience, and thus claim that indeed “all our knowledge begins with experience” because no exception to that was shown. The problem is that it did not happen that way. Galileo’s experiment was done earlier and the beginning of the whole story was not experience, but the principle question whether the earth is turning.

Such is the case with the “theory” of relativity, which, in actuality, is the epitome of absurdity that is the opposite of knowledge in its own sense of truthful knowledge. The world to this day considers it knowledge, when in fact it is absurdity, not knowledge. It is not knowledge, but is a deception ruled by absurdity, from the first moment of its inception, the very beginning. Would you say, for the sake of being in tune with Kant’s philosophy, that the one who perpetrated the mentioned fraud is involved in “experience” to generate this fraud, this beginning, an experience which in Kant’s world is the beginning of knowledge? If so, then such a beginning, such an experience, did not generate correct knowledge (never mind that the whole world to this day mistakes the result of such an experience for knowledge). If we cannot call it experience, as we should not, because it does not generate correct knowledge, then observing a rock falling straight down from the Tower of Pisa, also is not experience, as is not experience the already mentioned mendacious creation of a deceptive theory. How, then, if by experience we mean only that activity which leads to correct conclusions, can that activity be distinguished from something that looks like experience but leads to wrong conclusions?

The claim in the books of this author is that the only way to make such a distinction; that is, distinction between experience resulting in correct knowledge and experience resulting in incorrect knowledge (if we allow ourselves to use the word knowledge at all when talking about error), is to apply the scientific method, a method that separates the wheat from the chaff, which Kant’s “all our knowledge begins with experience”, on the contrary, mixes together into a pool of confusion.

The only correct knowledge is attained through the application of the scientific method, which amounts to more than experience. In addition to experience, the scientific method applies analysis and defines the direction as to what particular additional experience we should undertake and what other tools from the arsenal of science we need to attract, so that what we will conclude would constitute truthful knowledge. When Galileo chose to observe, out of the many things he could have observed, exactly the swinging chandelier in Pisa Cathedral, it was the choice of a genius who knew exactly what experience would serve to acquire new knowledge. This indicated choice of experience, having as its ultimate goal the production of knowledge, is not at all simply “all our knowledge begins with experience,” but is a specific kind of experience, the experience of a genius, involving his ability to analyze logically and truthfully what he observes and finding connections between quantities which others did not see. Indeed, it was not only the experience Galileo had with the swinging chandelier that allowed him to produce the knowledge about the pendulum. The Aristotelians would have had the same experience had they happened to see the same swinging chandelier. However, it would not have occurred to them that such an object was worthy of attention in the first place, nor would it have occurred to them to measure the length of the pendulum string, the mass of the pendulum, and the swing time, the period of the pendulum. They had rulers to measure length and hourglasses to measure time, they could have measured mass. Everything that they needed to have experience in terms of this swinging object that would bring them knowledge about it, they had. However, they did not gain knowledge. Galileo did. Galileo did it because he went beyond experience and engaged his cognitive faculties, which he had before the experience, in such a way that those faculties allowed him to derive the most general rules for periodic systems based on specifically chosen typical characteristics and quantities that allowed the reproduction of those relationships for any periodic system. If Galileo hadn’t had the cognitive faculties in the first place, he wouldn’t have even had the experience. He wouldn’t have identified the movement of the pendulum as an experience that would bring him knowledge, it would just be one of the ordinary things that happen around him. Therefore, not all knowledge begins with experience. At the very least, prior to experience, are the innate abilities of the explorer that have found fertile soil in which to reveal themselves and develop, through education, so that one day the explorer would meet with that particular experience that would lead him to generating truthful knowledge. The scientific method directs the further steps of the investigator, not to just any experience in the hope that it will yield knowledge, but to an experience in very precise directions. Since the question is whether the earth rotates, the experience sought is a matter of scientific input, involving many other components such as, analysis and synthesis, knowledge acquired through education, which governs even intuition to instruct it what to look for, not just experience. Therefore, if the earth is turning, it must exhibit Coriolis force. That knowledge that the turning of the earth invokes Coriolis force, is not a direct consequence of the experience we had with the falling stone, but is required in order to make a conclusion from that experience as to whether the earth is turning. The latter knowledge does not come about beginning with the experience we have when we throw the stone from the Pisa Tower. We know it beforehand. Therefore, the object of investigation, the need for Coriolis force, let alone the very knowing what Coriolis force is, is what is determined first, it is the beginning, and only then are the conditions for a specific attempt, for a specific experience to detect this force, sought. Therefore, in order to know whether the earth turns, that knowledge does not begin with experience. There are necessarily additional earlier steps which we must undertake prior to whatever sort of experience we may think of for checking the reality of such rotation, and if we really need a convincing experience, we must begin by knowing that we need to build an appropriate contraption—a Foucault pendulum—which will detect such a force, in order to acquire the true knowledge that the earth turns by experiencing the change of the plane on which the pendulum sways.

Here is another example in discord with Kant’s maxim, again from the “theory” of relativity. The knowledge of the absurdity of the “theory” of relativity does not begin with the experience of reading its founding paper, but is preceded by basic education in science and by the prior knowledge, in principle, that, for example, a conclusion that “one is equal to two” is an absurdity and that an absurdity cannot comprise a scientific theory. Prior to the experience of reading the exposé of the “theory”, with the aim to acquire knowledge about it, we must also have the determination to critically analyze it and to shed the fear that such analysis will harm our professional reputation and even societal image, threatened with destruction by a very zealous army of determined advocates of that pathological “theory”. Only then, once armed with such knowledge (not experience) as the beginning, as well as valiance, we may apply them to the experience of reading the paper and thus deduce the further knowledge; namely, that the “theory” in question is absurdity and is not a scientific theory at all. Therefore, it is not true that “all our knowledge begins with experience”, as Immanuel Kant pontificates, also in the case of acquiring the knowledge about the true essence of the “theory” of relativity.

Notably, this earlier knowledge may arrive from even earlier knowledge, until, in the long run, a point is reached when there exist truths which are generic, which cannot be sustained by other truths. For example, the knowledge of the absolute truth that \(E = mc^2\), a relationship which the author of the “theory” of relativity has nothing to do with, neither can his “theory” derive it, despite the rampant vigorous propaganda that it does, follows classically from the absolute truth that velocity is the quotient of the numerical expression of space and the numerical expression of time and that acceleration is the quotient of the numerical expression of space and the numerical expression of time squared. There is no earlier truth regarding velocity and acceleration, space and time being the ultimate notions which cannot be defined by other notions. Thus, in the case of the knowledge that \(E = mc^2\), it is also not true that “all our knowledge begins with experience”, because \(E = mc^2\) is intrinsic in classical physics, as is explained in my latest book “Deception Governed by Absurdities—The Science of Today”, and our knowledge of it is preceded, not by the experience, but by the knowledge of time, space and their derivatives. In a similar vein, the knowledge regarding the reality of the “COVID-19 pandemic”, needs no experience on the part of the anonymous insignificant, other than the knowledge of fulfillment of the “no-significants’-death-from/with-COVID-19” criterion.

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